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Abstract
In MEDRESET’s final policy recommendations, aimed at the new European Parliament, 
Commission and High Representative, we propose that the EU should become a more reflexive 
actor in the Mediterranean. Three related steps are key to take into this direction: (1) Substance: 
Begin to have periodic screening reports of EU policies and the possible harmful effects they 
have, and set up a study commission to reflect on a new development model for the whole 
Mediterranean, Europe included. (2) Actors: Work with local non-co-opted civil society and 
include it in all stages of policy-making towards third countries. (3) Instruments: Come forward 
with a reconciliation, “do no harm” and dialogue policy.
Introduction
MEDRESET has started from the observation that EU policies in the Mediterranean, as well 
as parts of the literature on them, have been characterized by a Eurocentric approach which 
has featured: (1) a narrow geopolitical conceptualization of the Mediterranean space driven 
by European economic and security interests; (2) the application of European concepts and 
values to the Mediterranean, manifested also in a sectoral (instead of integrated) approach 
to deeply linked policy issues; and (3) the marginalization of local perspectives and human 
security concerns/the needs of people in the region. In an increasingly multipolar world, 
overcoming this Eurocentric approach is key for Europe to play a more meaningful role in the 
region (Onar and Nicolaïdis 2013).
Thus, MEDRESET aimed to reset our understanding of the Mediterranean and develop 
alternative visions for a future role for the EU in the region. To do this, it developed a non-
Eurocentric research design which has been anchored in three analytical dimensions 
(substance, actors, instruments) and in three phases. In a first phase, we de-constructed the 
EU’s construction of the Mediterranean through critical discourse analysis (WP1). In a second 
phase, we contrasted the EU construction by mapping the Mediterranean on the geopolitical 
level (WP2), as well as through an elite survey (WP3) and through recursive multi-stakeholder 
consultation (RMSC) in four work packages on political ideas (WP4), agriculture and water 
(WP5), energy and industry (WP6) and migration and mobility (WP7). As described elsewhere 
in more detail (Huber et al. 2018), these consultations were set up in a way which allowed 
us to reverse the ordinary approach by which perceptions and priorities of Southern shore 
partners are included in the picture only marginally and/or a posteriori. Instead, stakeholders 
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in the EU (institutional and civil society) had to react and position themselves with reference 
to structured inputs coming from Mediterranean partners. All in all we pursued 697 interviews 
in the elite survey and the RMSCs which are visualized by gender, work package and country 
in Figure 1. With the enormous amount of qualitative data MEDRESET has produced through 
these interviews, we add a new dimension to the existing mainly quantitative data, see for 
example the results of ArabTransformation surveys (Abbott et al. 2018) or EuroMeSCo surveys 
(IEMed 2018). To our knowledge no other research project has ever so thoroughly scrutinized 
perceptions on all sides of the Mediterranean through qualitative analysis.
In the third phase, we are seeking to reconstruct a new role for the EU in the region. In this 
respect, the policy reports and briefs of Work Packages 3–7 have already given country- and 
issue-tailored recommendations (MEDRESET 2018b, Chaaban et al. 2018, MEDRESET 2018a, 
2018c, 2018d, 2019c), which are summed up in our infographics and key policy recommendation 
sheets (MEDRESET 2019a). What clearly comes across in them is that the EU’s ‘one fits all’ 
model should be reviewed in order for the EU to develop a more nuanced appreciation of 
the socio-economic diversity and unevenness of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, gender-
specific recommendations have been provided as well (Ghosheh 2019), while the report on 
the effectiveness and potential of EU policies in the Mediterranean by Münevver Cebeci 
represents an analysis of all empirical research pursued in MEDRESET from an effectiveness 
perspective, assessing the latter “in terms of a relationship among equals, finding bottom-up 
solutions to problems common to the region and desecuritizing relations between the two 
sides of the Mediterranean” (Cebeci 2019: 2–3).
Based on all these policy reports, it is the task of this final report to re-construct a new role for 
the EU in the Mediterranean in terms of its policies’ substance, involved actors and instruments. 
While we do want to give concrete policy recommendations which put local perceptions, 
concerns and needs upfront, this report does not intend to give a shopping list which would 
risk simply reducing the status quo or could even serve to strengthen the “EU as empire” 
(Zielonka 2006, Del Sarto 2016). Rather what we are aiming at is an EU which becomes a more 
reflexive actor in the Mediterranean. This report gives concrete recommendations for the new 
European Parliament, Commission and High Representative in this direction.
Figure 1 | Interviewed stakeholders by type, gender, work package and country
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Interviewed stakeholders
Youth organizations, human, socio-economic, women/minority/identity rights organizations, 
rural development organizations, new social movements, student movements, Islamic 
organizations, unemployment organizations, trade unions, syndicates, activists, journalists, 
artists, academics, doctors, agriculture organizations, farmers’ cooperatives, small and 
medium enterprises, private sector, federations, energy companies, officials in public 
institutions, international organizations, migration and asylum organizations.
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1. Substance: Becoming More Responsive to Local 
Needs
In her report, Cebeci points out that “the EU pursues asymmetric/unequal, top-down, 
Eurocentric, interest-driven, technocratic, depoliticizing policies in the Mediterranean 
prioritizing security and stability over democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Cebeci 
2019: 2). This approach limits the EU’s scope for action and relevance for people in the region.
Migration is an eminent example of this. In contrast to energy or the industrial sector which 
are largely absent from or only peripherally part of EU policies (Guesmi and Moisseron 
2018), migration is seen as looming large in EU policies, approached in a highly securitized 
way as became clear in MEDRESET’s elite survey (Dark 2018: 10). Some European funding 
instruments, such as the Trust Fund for Africa for example, which are meant to support socio-
economic development are instead used to finance border control, migration management 
and securitizing policies (Roman 2018: 9). Also, the EU’s response to migration legitimizes “the 
idea that not fully respecting international legal standards could be justified for the sake of 
achieving control-oriented policy objectives” (Roman 2018: 12).
Furthermore, the EU mainly seeks to enhance trade, rather than developing the industrial sector. 
However, the establishment of free trade areas can be accompanied by high social costs (Zorob 
2017). South Mediterranean countries are indeed reluctant to implement free trade areas for 
fear of high social costs resulting from competition between their local market actors and the 
European providers. A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) may worsen 
the situation in terms of unemployment, labour precariousness and job losses, specifically 
for women (Moisseron et al. 2017: 20). In Morocco, the existing Free Trade Area (FTA) with the 
EU is criticized for having deteriorated the country’s trade deficit (Moisseron et al. 2018: 22). In 
the case of Lebanon, stakeholders argue that the Association Agreement, along with steps 
taken to ensure Lebanon’s accession to the WTO, have hurt Lebanese exports and worsened 
the trade deficit (Chaaban et al. 2018: 9). Moreover, export-oriented sectors tied to the EU are 
mainly concentrated on low-value-added sectors providing poor quality working conditions, 
particularly for women. The way in which Southern countries have been integrated to the 
European Market (i.e., low technological subcontracting) therefore leads to a development 
model that is not compatible with the qualified youth entering the job market (Aboushady et 
al. 2019). Furthermore, the types of FDI coming from the EU do not create jobs and generate 
spillovers. One European stakeholder pointed out that these flows were allocated towards the 
acquisition of privatized companies in less labour-intensive sectors, such as banking, oil and 
real estate. These investments also neither generate spillovers and innovation, nor provide a 
larger access to EU markets for SMCs (Bianchi et al. 2018: 14).
As for energy policies, they are seen as mainly “market oriented” (Moisseron and Guesmi 
2018: 2); their scope remains timid and below the needs of the South Mediterranean countries. 
Furthermore, local civil society actors give increasing priority to the environmental effects of 
some energy policies, effects which are rarely taken into account by EU policies and national 
governments. In Egypt, they are mobilizing against coal that pollutes the environment, harms 
people’s health and destroys marine life. In Tunisia they protest against hydraulic shale gas 
extraction, asking for a fair distribution of mineral resources such as oil. Civil society actors are 
also aware about the political implications of renewable energy projects. Regarding the export 
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of renewable energy across the Mediterranean they express serious concern regarding the 
extent to which locals will benefit; domestic elites and foreigners are likely to benefit the most 
since the people are denied control over land (Aboushady et al. 2019: 13).
As for agriculture, the numerous partnerships with the EU are often seen as having 
disproportionately served EU commercial interests and were claimed to be a covert means for 
the EU to flood Mediterranean markets with high-priced products from the EU, while pursuing 
protectionism against agricultural exports of South-Mediterranean countries (Hamade et al. 
2018: 5). Similarly, European stakeholders in the field of agriculture are equally reluctant to 
engage as they fear these exports, and suspect wage and environmental dumping on the 
part of SEM countries (Woertz and Martínez 2018: 23). What is seen as necessary instead 
is sustaining local production as an important contribution to their countries’ food security: 
the current focus, promoted by EU policies and national governments, on the production of 
export-oriented products has diverted attention away from production of grains and other 
staple crops that make an important contribution to these countries’ food security. Regarding 
the access to EU markets, small farmers suffer from a lack of competitiveness locally and 
internationally due to outdated equipment, inefficient modes of production and low margins. 
Furthermore, the mostly informal agricultural work is another issue as wageworkers in the 
agricultural sector, particularly in export-oriented crops, are not protected and do not fall 
under the scope of the Labour Law. The work of women in agriculture often remains unpaid, 
not accounted for by national statistics and highly exploited in agribusiness. Also neglected by 
EU policies are structural issues such as gender inequalities in access to land.
In conclusion, policies and practices in all these policy areas have contributed little to good 
quality job creation, inclusive growth or the sorts of structural change that are much needed 
to redress the profound inequalities within a given country and between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean. The EU should be concerned with issues of decent jobs and better working 
conditions particularly in those export-oriented sectors tied to the EU, including female-
dominated sectors in industry and agriculture, as well as environmental justice.
As proposed by several stakeholders, there is need for a more thorough and up-dated socio-
economic and ecological assessment of what, for example, trade and energy policies can lead 
(or are leading) to, including within Europe itself. Also, a human rights perspective should start 
informing trade agreements by paying attention to social rights and environmental effects. 
Thus, the EU should set up periodic screening reports in that respect. Social assessment of 
trade, energy, agricultural and migration policies and programmes should be carried out by 
giving the task to grassroots civil society actors that are in the field and can provide information 
that considers the views of civil society, local communities and workers.
Furthermore, what is needed is a reflection on the broader development model within which 
EU policies are developed and seated. The EU hegemonic model is no longer seen as a model 
for the region which needs a more sustainable and equitable model that can ensure social 
and ecological justice. The need for an alternative model has been a major claim raised by 
civil society stakeholders, not only in the South, but in the EU as well. European civil society 
stakeholders argued that “the EU itself is adopting an economic model [...] which does not 
take care of social issues, and is worsening the situation of European populations” (Huber and 
Paciello 2018: 9). Thus, there is a decisive convergence between Mediterranean stakeholders 
on this issue, and the EU should become aware that its economic and political model is fraught 
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with many problems and is in crisis both internally and externally. Indeed, one European 
interviewee argued that the “EU could turn to the South of the Mediterranean saying that it 
is rethinking a new model [... and] to try to understand together which model we could adopt, 
always tailored to the local context” (Huber and Paciello 2018: 9).
Profound reflection is necessary in order to move ahead with a real systemic transformation 
and to start listening to the needs of people from both the South and the North. However, 
the dependent trade relations with Europe, the specialization of the South Mediterranean 
countries as well as the pressure applied by the EU to further enlarge trade agreements are 
strong obstacles to rethinking their own social and economic policies in ways that favour social 
justice and fair redistribution (Huber et al. 2018, Aboushady et al. 2019). Thus, the EU should set 
up an independent study commission to start rethinking its development model. This study 
commission should consist of independent academics, as well as journalists and civil society 
organizations from both the North and the South of the Mediterranean to start this reflection, 
bringing together different perspectives on how to build an alternative model, reflecting local 
specificities, and prepare concrete proposals to present to the EU institutions.
2. Actors: Towards Inclusion
EU policies are also questioned because of their top-down approaches. In the fields of 
migration, agriculture, energy and industry, the main partners of the EU continue to be 
governments and public authorities. In all Work Packages, the need to include local civil 
society actors in deciding the issue priorities of aid, for example, appeared as key, rather 
than having Western experts seconded to these countries setting this agenda. For example, 
professional agricultural organizations in Morocco and Lebanon criticized the EU’s top-down 
approach, for excluding certain actors such as local civil society organizations, while heavily 
including traditional public institutions such as the Ministry of Finance. Rather than including 
the knowledge and perceptions of stakeholders, the latter have little say in the matter and are 
subjected to top-down decisions of a centralized government. The same finding came across 
in the elite survey (Dark 2018: 13).
When the EU does work with local civil society actors, it frequently does so with those that are 
part of international NGO networks, excluding genuinely local grassroots. As Emanuela Roman 
has pointed out for the area of migration,
the majority of local civil society organizations complained about the lack of a truly 
participatory decision-making process and express their wish to actively participate 
in migration policy-making. Those local CSOs involved in the implementation of 
EU-funded projects and in the dialogue with the EU are part of international NGO 
networks, have strong links with Europe, professional staff, and the administrative skills 
and know how to access and manage EU funding, whereas smaller genuinely local 
grassroots CSOs whose international network is limited and whose activity is largely 
based on voluntary work, struggle to be involved in policy-making and consultations. 
(MEDRESET 2018d: 5)
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Similarly, Asma Nouira and Hamadi Redissi have suggested that EU contributions are perceived 
to be biased to pro-Western elites and civil society (Nouira and Redissi 2018: 14). The genuinely 
local grassroots organizations are often unable to access EU funding because they are less 
organized and have a limited international profile. These organizations are locally embedded 
and may have deeper knowledge of the local context; therefore, their active involvement in 
both policy-making and implementation represents a key factor contributing to policies in line 
with people’s needs.
The EU also needs to stop perceiving civil society as a service provider to the EU; civil society 
works in the service of specific aims it considers important for its own society. In response to 
EU funding for specific issues it considers important, civil society has professionalized; it is 
not only organizing its activities in line with EU needs, but is even structurally dependent on 
donors. Some interviewees argued that the EU is supporting a range of inefficient, corrupt and 
co-opted organizations (Huber et al. 2018: 13).
Furthermore, EU projects and policies do not reach marginalized categories such as poor and 
working women, small farmers, landless peasants, and precarious and exploited workers in 
industry and agriculture sectors. This is also well reflected in the fact that all Work Packages in 
MEDRESET met with difficulties in addressing the interviews to such actors. Any assessment of 
EU policies and future research should do as much as possible to involve such actors.
This reliance on civil society should, however, not serve as an excuse for the EU to drop the 
burden entirely on them. While EU aid is seen more positively than the aid of other actors, 
assistance to civil society is not enough when not backed up by political pressure. By ignoring 
regression in human rights, the EU will continue to reinforce authoritarianism. The EU’s support 
for civil society cannot serve to depoliticize its role in sustaining these authoritarian regimes. 
This came across in the interviews in Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia (political ideas): on one hand 
the EU supports civil society organizations, and on the other hand sides with authoritarian 
regimes thus reinforcing the status quo (Huber et al. 2018). The real solution, as Khalid Mouna 
(2018) has argued, lies in supporting the local struggles for democracy.
Thus, the EU should work more with grassroots actors and civil society organizations in all fields 
at the level of decision-making, from being consulted in the phase of negotiations between 
the EU and South Mediterranean states to project assessment.
3. Instruments: Moving Against Fragmentation and 
Separation
There is a fragmentation of EU policies. This is, firstly, evident in terms of substance (as already 
elaborated in detail above). In industry and energy, EU policies remain limited to fragmented 
financial and technical assistance programmes serving trade enhancement, trade facilitation 
and increased competitiveness in traditional sectors characterized by low added value and by 
intensity in unskilled labour. Similarly, we observe fragmentation and low involvement of the 
EU in the field of energy (Aboushady et al. 2019).
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Secondly, fragmentation is also evident in instruments, specifically in the increasing bilateralism 
which dominates fields such as migration but also trade (see also MEDRESET elite survey, 
Dark 2018: 7–9). Bilateralism favours power asymmetries because trade agreements, for 
example, are negotiated between an economic giant such as the EU as a bloc with single 
Southern countries that are “in consequence ‘weak and with little bargaining power vis-à-
vis the EU, making the relationship highly unfair/unequal” (Huber et al. 2018: 9). According to 
Southern stakeholders, the concept of the Mediterranean does not exclusively rely on North–
South integration, but also includes South–South cooperation (Aboushady et al. 2019). The 
region remains one of the least integrated in the world. Energy cooperation between the EU 
and the South Mediterranean countries is often on a member state basis (Bianchi et al. 2018: 
11). As pointed out by SEM stakeholders for agriculture, without a macro/regional vision the 
Mediterranean is condemned to be an arena for control and risk-reduction policies rather than 
a space of opportunities. Multilateral and comprehensive policies are needed in all policy 
areas observed: human rights, migration, trade, energy or agriculture.
This fragmentation is further augmented by incoherence; EU member states do not act 
coherently with the EU agenda and tend to overshadow EU policies in all sectors. There are 
perceived contradictions between the position of the EU (specifically its agenda of democracy, 
human rights and social equality) and those of individual member states.
Furthermore, fragmentation is driven by securitization. Work Package 2 (geopolitics) found 
that similarly to the EU, all other powers in the Mediterranean – USA, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey – are securitizing this space. Conventional approaches 
to “hard” security drive their policy, but their definitions of security are incompatible, leading to 
“dramatic divergences in their approaches and priority areas” which fragment the Mediterranean 
(MEDRESET 2017: 2). As the EU does not have a different vision for the Mediterranean, it allows 
other powers to determine the geopolitical space of which it is part.
As a result of such fragmentation, the Mediterranean is increasingly seen as a space of 
disparity, division and separation (Huber et al. 2018). What is, therefore, needed is a larger 
reflection process on the part of the EU and its member states on their approach to the 
Mediterranean which has been at the base of the EU’s devised instruments. In her final report, 
Cebeci concludes that
if the EU continues to pursue its Eurocentric, asymmetrical (unequal), top-down, 
depoliticizing, technocratic and securitizing policies in the region, based on an 
imbalanced construction of the Mediterranean where EU-Europeans are seen as 
superior to their Southern and Eastern Mediterranean counterparts, then we will 
continue producing and reproducing reports on the EU’s ineffectiveness and limited 
potential in the Mediterranean. (Cebeci 2019: 19)
To reset this approach and stop the downward path of separation, we propose that the EU 
come forward with a new comprehensive reconciliation, “do no harm” and dialogue policy.
10
MEDRESET Policy Papers
No. 10, July 2019
4. A Reconciliation, “Do No Harm” and Dialogue Policy 
for the Mediterranean
Reconciliation had been raised in our first round of interviews in Lebanon by a Palestinian 
refugee worker who proposed that the EU should respond to “its colonial past where countries 
of the Mediterranean were influenced by policies from different EU countries”. Indeed, the EU 
has a somewhat a-historical approach perceiving itself as a departure from Europe’s colonial 
past, even though some member states were still colonial/imperial powers when the European 
Economic Community (EEC) was founded. The interviewee proposed to
(A) Establish a reconciliation mechanism which would make the colonialist archive 
open and accessible for colonized nations to know about policies and practices of 
colonialist powers. (B) Issue an official apology for crimes and other forms of aggression 
conducted against colonized nations. (C) Encourage and support research that looks 
into colonialism and its impact on the current migration and socio-economic and 
political conflicts across the region. (Interviewee cited in unpublished MEDRESET 
interim report, autumn 2017)
Other interviewees suggested that reconciliation could be connected to two levels, national 
and regional. At the national level, the need for reconciliation in Syria, Israel/Palestine, in Egypt 
or in Lebanon was highlighted, along with the potential role the EU should and could play 
in fostering such reconciliation. At the regional level, the colonial baggage in Mediterranean 
relations, and the need to build a truly equal and non-xenophobic Mediterranean space 
came across. Interviewees highlighted that a broad reconciliation process could work both 
against xenophobia in Europe and against the nationalist, exclusive discourse of authoritarian 
governments; or that we need to rethink the idea of neighbourhood “that goes beyond the 
idea of putting limits to the borders in order to secure them. It is important to build a common 
shared history – ‘histoire partagée’ – and representation of neighbourhood” (Huber and Paciello 
2018: 17).
What reconciliation means for the past, is what the “do no harm” principle would mean for 
the present. In our interviews, the EU was perceived to pursue several harmful policies and 
practices. Firstly, the EU is seen as having a selective commitment to human rights. It harms 
the rights of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean, setting a bad example for others. 
Furthermore, while funding civil society organizations, it is silent about human right violations 
perpetrated by authoritarian and occupation regimes and it is cooperating with them to pursue 
its migration policies. It is perceived as delivering aid into the hands of corrupt and repressive 
governments and financially supporting their top-down initiatives. Also, by presenting human 
rights as European instead of universal values, it is jeopardizing the agency of local human 
rights actors and the action of women’s organizations (Huber et al. 2018: 17). As pointed out by 
a Moroccan interviewee:
Europe holds a culturalist view towards countries of the south in general, and towards 
us specifically. It is thought that we are not fit for the human rights culture under the 
pretext that Islam is [an] impediment. Hence, Europeans think that we are establishing 
human rights institutions because they force us to do so. It does not occur to them that 
the human rights issue is our fight because it is we who have suffered and been put in 
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jail. It is both founded on a superiority point of view and contempt towards what we are 
trying to achieve. (Mouna 2018: 15)
Finally, by putting pressure on South Mediterranean countries to pursue a purely export-
oriented development model, which pays no attention to local needs, the EU threatens social 
and economic rights, exacerbating inequalities and constraining the opportunities for a genuine 
economic and social development/inclusive growth.
Being instead guided by the “do no harm” principle would mean that the EU makes sure 
its policies and programmes do not infringe on local people’s needs and human security. 
Thus, a social justice and human rights centred vision to empower people on all shores of 
the Mediterranean would be the necessary reference point to overcoming securitization and 
separation. Following the principle of “no harm” means above all a deep understanding of the 
local context and political economy power dynamics. To start going in that direction, the EU 
needs to start dialoguing and consulting with local civil society. That means not just inviting 
them once to Brussels, but really starting to listen to them. It also means dialogue as a means 
to reconnect across the Mediterranean and work against the perception of division, disparity 
and separation. As already elaborated above, periodic screening reports, a study commission 
on an alternative development model and the inclusion of civil society in all stages of policy-
making would all work towards ensuring the “do no harm” principle.
Dialogue should also go beyond civil society and aim to reconnect and work against the 
perceived separation of the Mediterranean for a shared future. In MEDRESET’s final policy 
brief (MEDRESET 2019b), we have already recommended that the EU set up a Research 
Foundation for the Mediterranean whose aim should be to foster local research by local 
researchers in local institutions all across the Mediterranean. It should also include funding for 
a strong mobility dimension to support travel within Europe and the Mediterranean, as well as 
for attending international conferences, including help for getting visas, etc. Such a foundation 
would be an excellent instrument to provide support to young people, higher education and 
research capacities/institutions in countries which have less means to invest in these, with 
positive effects on the Euro-Mediterranean area at large. Synergies with existing initiatives 
such as the Young Mediterranean Voices or EuroMeSCo could also be established. To further 
strengthen dialogue beyond research, a similar foundation for media, film and arts could be 
established, as well. Finally, the EU could consider launching a Mediterranean high school 
exchange programme. This would be an ambitious approach which can reconnect young 
people across the Mediterranean ensuring a shared future of societies with a longer lasting 
impact than any ministerial meetings as originally envisaged in the Barcelona Process ever 
can.
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